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The Role of Precedent in Defining Res
Judicata in Investor–State Arbitration
By Pedro J. Martinez-Fraga* and Harout Jack Samra**
Abstract: As international arbitration, and investment arbitration in particular,
becomes more prevalent, the risks of doctrinal fragmentation also increase, in
part driven by the disparate treatment of the doctrine of res judicata throughout
most jurisdictions, and in the arbitration context. Notwithstanding the general
consensus regarding the broad contours of res judicata and its firm position as
a principle of international law, there is little agreement regarding how it is to
be administered. These developments threaten to undermine the international
arbitration system, wresting from it normative legitimacy. The U.S. common
law version of res judicata, which is distinct from res judicata as developed in
many civil law jurisdictions, may serve as a substantial conceptual foundation
upon which civil law and other common law res judicata precepts may merge to
fashion a uniform doctrine applicable in international arbitration that is
expansive, substantive/transactional-based as to criteria, and non-formalistic in
its application so as to avert and discourage the doctrine’s circumvention
through the use of legal fictions.
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Oedipus: Let it be then; have your way only if come he must, I beg of you my
friend, do not grant them jurisdiction to rule on my fate.
Thesus: Sir, there is no need for you to plea a second time.
1

- Sophocles, Oedipus at Colonus

I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
While economic globalization has found its legal counterpart in
international trade law, juridical globalization in the field of cross-border
contentions is yet to arise. The virtually monolithic configuration of
international trade law stands in sharp relief with the fragmented body of
principles of international public law governing investor–state arbitrations.
1

SOPHOCLES, OEDIPUS AT COLONUS, at 260 (F. Storr ed., Loeb Classical Library ed.
1981) (c. 406 B.C.E.) (translation by author) (ΟΙΔΙΠΟΥΣ: έστω δ’ ούν όπως ύμϊν φίον.
μόνον, ξέν, είπερ κεϊνος ώδ’ ελεύσεται, μηδείς κρατείτω τής έμής ψυχής ποτε. ΘΗΣΕΥΣ:
άπαξ τα τοιαϋτ, ούχί δίς χρήζω κλύειν, ώ πρέβυ).
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Yet, these non-uniform and fragmented principles of private and public
international law serve a decisive role in administering the relationship
between capital-exporting and capital-importing countries. Thus, their role
is pivotal to the material effects of economic globalization. Many
commentators have expressed concern that as international arbitration, and
investment arbitration in particular, becomes more prevalent, the risks of
doctrinal fragmentation also increase, both undermining the international
arbitration system and wresting from it normative legitimacy. This risk is
underscored generally by the disparate treatment of the doctrine of res
judicata throughout most jurisdictions, and, more specifically, as the
doctrine applies to international commercial and investor–state arbitration.
There is a general consensus in international arbitration with respect to
two issues: first, arbitral tribunals universally accept the principle of res
judicata, or claim preclusion—the principle that, once adjudicated, a claim
cannot be raised again. Second, arbitral tribunals accept what is referred to
as the “triple identity” test as the determinative standard for the application
of res judicata to a further proceeding. The triple identity test in res judicata
prevents relitigation of claims (1) between the same parties (2) regarding
the same subject matter, and (3) on the same legal grounds.2 Because of the
ostensible simplicity of the triple identity test, together with the
international adoption of the doctrine, one might reach the misguided
proposition that the current formulation of the res judicata doctrine as
applied in international arbitration is not meaningfully or materially
wanting. Such an assumption, however, obfuscates the multiple salient
problems that command the fashioning of the application of a uniform
doctrine applicable to international arbitration.
At the very outset, there is a lack of uniformity in the application of the
doctrine because judicial tribunals, understandably as an expression of
sovereignty, apply fixed rules of res judicata to a specific jurisdiction for
purposes of determining the effect of an award on a further proceeding. 3
The doctrine of res judicata, however, varies—often materially—among
states and different legal systems, thus hampering application of the
doctrine in the context of international arbitration in ways that would
preserve and foster uniformity.
While certainly arbitral tribunals are not required to apply a doctrine of
2

Generally, but far from universally, the triple identity test proscribes a further
proceeding between (i) the same parties, (ii) arising from the identical transaction or causes
of action, and (iii) seeking the same relief. See Int’l Law Ass’n, Berlin Conference, Berlin,
China, 2004, International Commercial Arbitration Interim Report: “Res judicata” and
Arbitration, 2. See also Factory at Chorzów (Ger. v. Pol.), Interpretation of Judgments Nos.
7 & 8, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 13, at 23 (dissenting opinion of Judge Anzilotti).
3
This use of res judicata with the aim of proscribing a further or subsequent contention is
often referred to as “negative res judicata” as opposed to “positive res judicata,” which
concerns the use of an award to enforce its terms. This contribution shall be limited only to
analysis of “negative res judicata.”
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res judicata in the same manner as national courts, it is evident that the
manner in which res judicata is applied by arbitral tribunals and to arbitral
awards may not be altogether severed from the elements of the res judicata
doctrine that municipal courts apply to judgments, notwithstanding the
uniquely salient features of international arbitration—namely, that it is
bottomed on a private foundation for jurisdiction, 4 removed from a
sovereign’s exercise of sovereignty, its emphasis on a consensual precept in
the selection of arbitrators (decision makers), and its reliance on
institutional internationalized procedures, the applicability of which are also
founded on party-autonomy, and a consensual arrangement.
The U.S. common law version of res judicata may serve as a
substantial conceptual bastion from which civil law and common law res
judicata precepts may merge in fashioning a uniform doctrine that is
expansive, substantive/transactional-based as to criteria, and non-formalistic
in its application so as to avert and discourage the doctrine’s circumvention
through the use of legal fictions. This expansive version of the doctrine is
particularly well suited to address the complexities of applying res judicata
in the context of investor–state arbitration.
Following a succinct introduction that traces the contours of the
origins of res judicata in international law, including references to the
precedent and Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), a detailed
discussion of the fragmented system of res judicata ensues in Section III.
This analysis will include a review of the civil law and common law
approaches to the doctrine, with particular attention placed on the approach
adopted in United States jurisprudence. A review of the application of this
doctrine in the context of international arbitration, including investor–state
arbitration, follows in Section IV. Finally, emerging issues in investor–
state arbitration that implicate the development of res judicata in that arena
shall be considered.
II. THE ORIGINS OF PRECEDENT AND RES JUDICATA IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF THE STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
This paper begins with a consideration of the origins of the doctrine of
res judicata in international law, including the development of its
acceptance. The Statute of the ICJ and the ample precedent that this
international judicial body has generated provide a vast source of
4
This “private” foundation is cognizable in investor–state arbitration pursuant to the
“offer-acceptance” theory of consent arising from a national investor-protection statute that
serves as an offer that in turn may be deemed accepted, among different ways, by the
actually filing of an arbitration demand. See David D. Caron, The Interpretation of National
Foreign Investment Laws as Unilateral Acts Under International Law, in LOOKING TO THE
FUTURE: ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HONOR OF W. MICHAEL REISMAN, 649, 649
(Mahnoush H. Arsanjani et al. eds., 2011).
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substantial authority. Indeed, in a 1954 ICJ case, res judicata was
recognized as a “well-established and generally recognized principal of
law.”5 This conclusion follows the precedent established—in dissent—by a
distinguished Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) jurist, Judge
Dionisio Anzilotti, who observed that res judicata was among the “general
principles of law recognised by civilised nations.”6 The significance of the
specific language that the ICJ and its predecessor the PCIJ adopted arises
from the terms of Article 38 of the ICJ Statute:
The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with
international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:
a. international conventions, whether general or particular,
establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states;
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice
accepted as law;
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and
the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various
nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of
law.7

As is readily discernible, the normative use of the doctrine of res
judicata by ICJ tribunals directly rests on the determination that the doctrine
is a “general principle[] of law recognized by civilized nations,” a
determination which, over eighty years since Judge Anzilotti’s famous
exegesis, is firmly fixed in the firmament of international jurisprudence,
including that of numerous recently issued international arbitral tribunals.
However, as shall be detailed, notwithstanding the general consensus
regarding the broad contours of the doctrine and its firm position as a
principle of international law, there is little agreement regarding how it is to
be administered.
III. THE FRAGMENTED CONFIGURATION OF RES JUDICATA
Despite the apparent uniformity with respect to the viability of res
judicata in international law, and the general agreement that this doctrine is
best administered through the application of the triple identity test, there is
in fact virtually no agreement as to how any of the three prongs of that test
should be applied in practice. Because of the universal acceptance of the
doctrine’s general contours, it is unsettling and deeply problematic that
there is so much dissonance concerning the doctrine’s application. Analysis
5

Effect of Awards of Compensation Made by the United Nations Administrative
Tribunal, Advisory Opinion, 1954 I.C.J. 47, 53 (July 13).
6
Factory at Chorzów (Ger. v. Pol.), Interpretation of Judgments Nos. 7 & 8, 1927 P.C.I.J.
(ser. A) No. 13, at 27 (dissenting opinion of Judge Anzilotti).
7
Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38.
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of national law, including—broadly speaking—the codifications adopted in
numerous civil law jurisdictions and the United States common law, renders
several readily identifiable categories of res judicata that are hardly
harmonized. As we shall demonstrate, these rubrics can be categorized as
being either formalistic or substantive/transactional. This article contends
that it is the latter that is most compatible with the juridical globalization of
international commercial arbitration and investor–state arbitration.
A. The Civil Law Approach
Although res judicata has been codified in most civil law jurisdictions
in Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East, rudimentary elements of the
doctrine are not uniformly articulated, let alone expansively applied. Each
individual civil law jurisdiction administers its own unique version of the
doctrine, typically pursuant to a methodology that emphasizes legal
formalism extremely narrow in scope.
These narrow, formalistic
applications of the doctrine are, therefore, ill-suited to the broad, complex
legal arrangements that characterize transnational commerce in a global
economy. An analysis of the res judicata provisions adopted by several
civil law jurisdictions reflects a significant lack of uniformity with respect
to each prong of the triple identity test. Nevertheless, despite the numerous
differences, the narrow, formalistic approach to the doctrine’s application
appears to be pervasive.
With respect to the first prong of the triple identity test, which requires
the identity of the parties to be the same, the jurisdictions analyzed can be
divided into four identifiable categories. First, the applicable code of some
jurisdictions only references “the same party.”8 Second, other jurisdictions
even further limited conceptually the first prong by identifying “the same
parties in the same or identical capacities.” 9 A third category applies “the
same parties and heirs” test, arguably adopting a more expansive approach

8
See, e.g., CÓDIGO DE PROCESSO CIVIL [C.P.C.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 301 (Braz.): “Uma
ação é idêntica à outra quando tem as mesmas partes, a mesma causa de pedir e o mesmo
pedido.” [“An action is identical to another when they have the same parties, the same cause
of action, and the same request.”]
9
See, e.g., CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 1351 (Fr.):

L’autorité de la chose jugée n’a lieu qu’à l’égard de ce qui a fait l’objet du
jugement. Il faut que la chose demandée soit la même; que la demande soit
fondée sur la même cause; que la demande soit entre les mêmes parties, et formée
par elles et contre elles en la même qualité. [The authority of res judicata does
not occur only with respect to the subject of the judgment. It is necessary that the
thing sought is the same, that the application is based on the same cause; that the
application is between the same parties, and formed by them and against them in
the same capacity.]
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to the doctrine’s application.10 Fourth, in some jurisdictions, the first prong
has been crafted as pertaining to “the same parties” (an explicit provision
for no third parties), leaving no doubt as to the narrow and formal
application of the prong.11
10

See, e.g., CÓDIGO
CODE] art. 177 (Chile):

DE

PROCEDIMIENTO CIVIL [CÓD. PROC. CIV.] [CIVIL PROCEDURE

La excepción de cosa juzgada puede alegarse por el litigante que haya obtenido
en el juicio y por todos aquellos a quienes según la ley aprovecha el fallo,
siempre que entre la nueva demanda y la anteriormente resuelta haya:
1. Identidad legal de personas;
2. Identidad de la cosa pedida; y
3. Identidad de la causa de pedir.
Se entiende por causa de pedir el fundamento inmediato del derecho deducido en
juicio.
[The doctrine of res judicata may be invoked by the litigant who has obtained a
judgment at trial and all those who, by law, are included in the decision whenever
the new claim and the previous result share:
1. Legal identity of persons;
2. Identity of the thing asked; and
3. Identity of the cause of action
Cause of action refers to the immediate legal grounds decided in the previous
judgment.]
11

See, e.g., CÓDIGO DE PROCESSO CIVIL [C.P.C.] [CIVILCODE ] arts. 469–70 (Braz.):
Art. 469 - Não fazem coisa julgada:
(I) os motivos, ainda que importantes para determinar o alcance da
parte dispositiva da sentença;
(II) a verdade dos fatos, estabelecida como fundamento da sentença;
(III) a apreciação da questão prejudicial, decidida incidentemente no
processo.
Art. 470 - Faz, todavia, coisa julgada a resolução da questão prejudicial, se a
parte o requerer (arts. 5º e 325), o juiz for competente em razão da matéria e
constituir pressuposto necessário para o julgamento da lide.
[Article 469 – Res Judicata does not apply to:
(I) the rationale, except that which is important to determine or advance the
dispositive portion of the judgment;
(II) the true facts, established as the foundation of the sentence;
(III) consideration of the question, incidentally decided in the process.
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A strict “same party” scheme leaves room for subsidiary or affiliate
corporate entities to circumvent res judicata finality.
Similar
gamesmanship is readily available with respect to representatives, agents,
principals, and other similar legal fictions. Likewise, pursuant to this
rubric, an individual in her or his personal capacity in the first action and as
the solitary shareholder of a corporation in the further proceeding would
theoretically be able to challenge quite meaningfully the doctrine’s
application.
The second prong of the triple identity test suffers from want of
uniformity and excessive formality. A number of the jurisdictions analyzed
seemed to define the second prong of the triple identity test as the “same
cause of action.”12 Others focused on what might best be characterized as
the “same underlying occurrence or transaction.”13 In a third category, the
language was inconclusive for purposes of definitively identifying whether
cause of action or underlying transaction or occurrence was intended. 14
Article 470 – It is, however, res judicata the resolution of the certified question, if the
part requires it (arts. 5 and 325), the court has jurisdiction in the matter and provide the
necessary presupposition for the trial of the suit.]
12
13

See, e.g., Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979).
CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 1351 (Fr.):
L’autorité de la chose jugée n’a lieu qu’à l’égard de ce qui a fait l’objet du
jugement. Il faut que la chose demandée soit la même; que la demande soit
fondée sur la même cause; que la demande soit entre les mêmes parties, et formée
par elles et contre elles en la même qualité. [The authority of res judicata does
not take place only with respect to the subject of the judgment. It is necessary
that the thing sought is the same; that the application is based on the same cause;
that the application is between the same parties, and formed by them and against
them in the same capacity.]

14

See, e.g., CÓDIGO PROCESAL CIVIL [CIVIL CODE] art. 123 (Peru):
Una resolución adquiere la autoridad de cosa juzgada cuando:
1. No proceden contra ella otros medios impugnatorios que los ya
resueltos; o
2. Las partes renuncian expresamente a interponer medios
impugnatorios o dejan transcurrir los plazos sin formularlos.
La cosa juzgada sólo alcanza a las partes y a quiénes de ellas deriven sus
derechos. Sin embargo, se puede extender a los terceros cuyos derechos
dependen de los de las partes o a los terceros de cuyos derechos dependen de los
de las partes, si hubieran sido citados con la demanda.
La resolución que adquiere la autoridad de cosa juzgada es inmutable, sin
perjuicio de lo dispuesto en los Artículos 178 y 407.
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Finally, none of the jurisdictions studied specified the particular type
of relief that would give rise to satisfaction of the third prong of the test.
Practically all identified the relief sought as “the same objective or
object.”15
Under
this
formulation,
a
formalistic,
nonsubstantive/transactional approach to the application of this third prong is
problematic. By way of example, a strict application of the civil law
codified doctrine generally would defeat application of the res judicata
doctrine where the first action alleged prohibitory injunctive relief and the
further proceeding averred mandatory injunctive relief. Similar nuanced
and less subtle machinations concerning the prayer for relief can be devised
without much challenge to the imagination with respect to, for example,
specific performance.
As to a straightforward pecuniary/quantum
application for damages, the ambiguity in the second prong—underlying
transaction/cause of action—can certainly justify non-application of the
doctrine merely by ascribing the damages petitioned in the further action as
arising from a different cause of action distinct from that asserted in the first
proceeding and predicated on a part of the underlying occurrence or
transaction that was not litigated or framed by the pleadings in the first
action.

[A judgment acquires the authority of res judicata when:
1. No other challenges other than those already resolved are pending
against it; or
2. The parties expressly waive any further challenges or permit
deadlines to pass without being acted upon.
Res judicata extends only to the parties and those who derive their rights
therefrom. However, it can be extended to third parties whose rights depend on
the rights of the parties or to third parties whose rights depend on the parties, if
they had been summoned to the lawsuit.
The resolution that acquires the authority of res judicata is immutable,
notwithstanding the provisions of Articles 178 and 407.]
15

See, e.g., CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 23 (Belg.).
L’autorité de la chose jugée n’a lieu qu’à l’égard de ce qui a fait l’objet de la
decision. Il faut que la chose demandée soit la même; que la demande soit fondée
sur la même cause; que la demande soit entre les mêmes parties, et formée par
elles et contre elles en la même qualité. [The authority of res judicata does occur
only with respect to the subject of the decision. It is necessary that the thing
sought is the same; that the application is based on the same cause; that the
application is between the same parties, and formed by them and against them in
the same capacity.]

427

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

32:419 (2012)

B. The U.S. Common Law Approach
The common law res judicata regime stands in stark contrast with its
civil law counterpart. The common law res judicata construct is materially
less formal and, therefore, significantly more expansive. Thus, it
meaningfully amplifies the doctrine’s application.
1. Common Law Public Policy
Contrary to the majority of civil law jurisdictions, the United States
Supreme Court, in Southern Pacific Railroad Company v. United States,16
set forth two tenets upon which res judicata as a juridical doctrine
constituted an integral part of judicial public policy. First, the Court
observed that “[t]his general rule [res judicata] is demanded by the very
object for which civil courts have been established, which is to secure the
peace and repose of society by the settlement of matters capable of judicial
determination.”17 Second, it was observed that:
[the] enforcement [of res judicata] is essential to the maintenance
of social order; for the aid of judicial tribunals would not be
invoked for the vindication of rights of person and property if, as
between parties and their privies, conclusiveness did not attend the
judgments of such tribunals concerning all matters properly placed
at issue, and actually determined by them. 18
The Court supplemented these two policy precepts by recognizing that a
fundamental objective of the doctrine is “[t]o preclude parties from
contesting matters that they have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate
protects their adversaries from the expense and vexation attending multiple
lawsuits, conserves judicial resources, and fosters reliance on judicial action
by minimizing the possibility of inconsistent decisions.”19
Consonant with its status as a matter of public policy, however, res
judicata, contrary to the majority of civil law jurisdictions, may be raised
16

168 U.S. 1, 18 (1897).
Id. at 48.
18
Id.
19
See Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979); see also Geoffrey C. Hazard,
Jr., Res Nova in Res Judicata, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 1036, 1042–43 (1971); Allan D. Vestal,
Preclusion/Res Judicata Variables: Adjudicating Bodies, 54 GEO. L.J. 857, 858 (1965). This
staunchly entrenched public policy status notwithstanding, the U.S. common law res judicata
scheme contemplates waiver of the doctrine’s applications if not timely raised by a party.
See, e.g., Arizona v. California, 530 U.S. 392, 410 (2000) (“We disapprove the notion that a
party may wake up because a ‘light finally dawned’ years after the first opportunity to raise a
defense [of res judicata] and effectively raise it so long as the party was (though no fault of
anyone else) in the dark until his late awakening.”); see also Pangburn v. Culbertson, 200
F.3d 65, 68 (2d Cir. 1999).
17
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sua sponte by a court of competent jurisdiction. 20 A predicate to judicial
initiative of this sort is that the Court must be “on notice that it has
previously decided the issue presented . . . even though the defense [res
judicata] has not been raised.”21
The common law public policy standing of res judicata also adopts the
time-honored tradition and general rule that a party “is not bound by
judgment in personam in a litigation in which he is not designated as party
or to which he has not been made a party by service of process.”22
2. The U.S. Common Law “Triple Identity” Test
The triple identity test is an integral part of the U.S. common law res
judicata doctrine. Despite multiple iterations of the test over time and in the
development of jurisprudence, a key recitation of the test provides that:
a right, question, or fact, distinctly put in issue, and directly
determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, as a ground of
recovery, cannot be disputed in a subsequent suit between the same
parties or their privies; and, even if the second suit is for a different
cause of action, the right, question, or fact once so determined must,
as between the same parties or their privies, be taken as conclusively
established so long as the judgment in the first suit remains
unmodified.23

The “sameness” or “identity” predicate, which arguably promotes a
broad application of the doctrine, finds eloquent expression in no fewer
than six exceptions to the rule against non-party claim preclusion, which
considerably temper the seemingly limiting character of the first prong
same party element. These exceptions are wholly foreign to civil law
jurisdictions.
The first exception provides that “[a] person who agrees to be bound
by the determination of issues in an action between others is bound in
accordance with the terms of his agreement.”24 Two examples of this
situation would be indemnity and insurance arrangements.
A second exception arises from preexisting juridical relationships
between the person to be bound and the party to the judgment. 25 These
relationships would include assignee and assignor, bailee and bailor, and
persons with interest in property (titleholders). 26
20

Arizona, 530 U.S. at 412.
Id.
22
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 110 (1969).
23
S. Pac. R.R. Co. v. United States, 168 U.S. 1, 48 (1897).
24
DAVID L. SHAPIRO, CIVIL PROCEDURE : PRECLUSION IN CIVIL ACTIONS 77–78 (2001); see
also California v. Texas, 459 U.S. 1096, 1097 (1983).
25
See Richards v. Jefferson County, 517 U.S. 793, 798 (1996).
26
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§43–44, §52, §55 (1982); see also Taylor
21
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A third exception arises where a non-party who was “adequately
represented by someone with the same interests who [was] a party” to the
suit, and, therefore, the non-party may be bound by the judgment in the first
action.27 Examples of representative actions that may have preclusive effect
on non-parties are (i) class actions, (ii) suits filed against trustees, (iii)
actions against guardians, and (iv) proceedings against fiduciaries. 28
Fourth, where a non-litigant assumes control over a litigation in which
judgment was rendered, the non-party exercising control shall be bound by
the issuing judgment.29
The fifth exception is triggered where a party seeks to re-litigate a case
through a proxy. Preclusion attaches when a party who did not participate
in the first-filed action files a claim as the designated representative of a
person who was a party in the first-adjudicated proceeding.30
The sixth exception is found where specific statutory enactments
foreclose successive litigation by non-parties, such as in probate and
bankruptcy proceedings.31
For the sake of being comprehensive, it should be noted that in 2008
the Supreme Court abolished a “virtual representation” exception to the
non-party exception preclusion that primarily had been developed by the
Eighth, Ninth, and D.C. Circuit Courts of Appeals. 32 Patently contradicting
the Supreme Court’s holding in Richards,33 these circuit courts relied upon
a multifactor standard for virtual representation that allowed for non-party
v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 894 (2008) (“These exceptions originated ‘as much from the
property law as from the values of preclusion by judgment.’”).
27
Taylor, 553 U.S. at 881 (citing Richards, 517 U.S. at 798).
28
Richards, 517 U.S. at 798.
29
Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 155 (1979). In this case the Supreme Court
found that the subject non-party bound by the judgment, the United States, had an active role
in:
(i) requiring the first suit to be filed,
(ii) reviewing and approving the complaint,
(iii) assuming responsibility for attorney’s fees and costs,
(iv) strategizing and directing an appeal from a State District Court to a State
Supreme Court,
(v) entering an appearance and submitting a brief in the capacity of amicus before
a State Supreme Court,
(vi) directing the filing of a notice of appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, and
(vii) causing petitioner abandonment of judicial appeal pursuant advice of the
Solicitor General of the United States.
Id. Montana suggests that the standard for “controlling a proceeding” entails a totality of
circumstances analysis. Id.
30
Chicago, R.I. & P.Ry. Co. v. Schendel, 270 U.S. 611, 620–23 (1926).
31
Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 762 (1989).
32
See Taylor, 553 U.S. at 880.
33
517 U.S. at 793.
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preclusion in cases beyond the six exceptions identified.34
The U.S. common law second prong of the triple identity test—cause
of action or subject matter—is similarly broader than that of its civil law
counterpart. Specifically, while the standard res judicata triple identity test
recitation merely states that “a final judgment on the merits bars further
claims by parties or their privies based on the same cause of action,”35 res
judicata precludes re-litigation of all causes of action, defenses, and
affirmative defenses that were available to a litigant in the first action but
not raised at that time. 36 This framework, which extends to causes of action
not even raised in the first proceeding, let alone not identical to those
asserted in the further action, is both theoretically and practically alien to
the triple identity test examined in civil law jurisdictions. This expansive
approach furthers the policy of finality that res judicata seeks to accomplish
by virtue of focusing on the actual substantive and transactional
configuration of the proceedings instead of relying on the narrow and
formalistic mechanics that undermine the doctrine.
3. Collateral Estoppel
The schism between civil and common law jurisdictions is
substantially enhanced by the U.S. common law doctrine of collateral
estoppel and the multiple nuances that define the doctrine. The collateral
estoppel nomenclature, for example, has been used to define the res judicata
effect against a non-party. In Montana v. United States, for example, the
Supreme Court observed that “preclusion of such non-parties falls under the
rubric of collateral estoppel rather than res judicata because the latter
doctrine presupposes identity between causes of action.”37 These references
notwithstanding, the Restatement (Second) of Judgments treats res judicata
as “claim preclusion” and collateral estoppel as “issue preclusion.” 38
“Defensive collateral estoppel” constitutes an occurrence where a defendant
attempts to proscribe a plaintiff from re-litigating an issue that the plaintiff
previously had litigated unsuccessfully in a prior action against the same or
a different party.39 Moreover, offensive collateral estoppel has been defined
as instances where a plaintiff aspires to foreclose a defendant from relitigating an issue that the defendant previously had unsuccessfully litigated
34
While the Sixth Circuit in Becherer v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
143 F.3d 415, 423 (6th Cir. 1999), held that “virtual representation” was no broader than
“adequate representation” as the Supreme Court had defined in Richards, the test enunciated
by the Eighth, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits, amplified the Supreme Court’s holding in Richards.
This conflict between the Circuits and the Supreme Court was expressly and directly laid to
rest by the Court in Taylor. See Taylor, 553 U.S. at 894.
35
Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979).
36
Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 131 (1979).
37
Montana, 440 U.S. at 154.
38
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §27 (1982).
39
See, e.g., Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 n.4 (1979).
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in a prior proceeding against the same or a different party.40
Collateral estoppel may apply either to issues of fact or law and
application of the doctrine is triggered by the triple identity test. 41 As with
res judicata, collateral estoppel does not require exact identity of the parties.
Instead, substantial identity shall suffice, assuming meaningful
commonality of interest.42
Notably, the doctrine of estoppel recognizes an exception for
“unmixed questions of law” in successive actions involving substantially
unrelated claims.43
Here the adjective “unmixed” and the adverb
“substantially” are paramount. Even though preclusive effect conclusively
attaches in a further litigation to issues of fact or law that were raised or that
could have been raised in a prior proceeding, an exception is amply
recognized where, in deciding a case, a court has articulated a rule or
principle of law; a party to a subsequent proceeding—upon a different
demand—is not estopped from arguing that the law is otherwise..44 This
exception, however, is limited only to cases where a pure legal issue was
pronounced in the first action (an unmixed question of law) and contested
in a subsequent proceeding that must be based upon a different demand:
“[b]ut a fact, question, or right distinctly adjudged in the original action
cannot be disputed in a subsequent action, even though the determination
was reached upon an erroneous view or by an erroneous application of the
law.”45
The U.S. common law doctrine of collateral estoppel carves out yet
another distinction that still furthers the gap between common and civil law
doctrine on preclusion that, in turn, is applicable to international arbitration.
The doctrine of collateral estoppel amply broadens the scope of this
40

See Alfred J. Weisbrod, Offensive Collateral Estoppel, 6 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 257,
257–58 (1983).
41
Montana, 440 U.S. at 154–55.
42
See, e.g., In Re Gottheiner, 703 F. 2d. 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 1983); see also
Stratosphere Litigation LLC v. Grand Casinos, 298 F.3d 1137, 1142 n.3 (9th Cir. 2002)
(finding privity when a party is “so identified in interest with a party to former litigation that
he represents precisely the same right in respect to the subject matter involved”); Shaw v.
Hahn, 56 F.3d 1128, 1131–32 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding privity when the interests of the party
in the subsequent action were shared with and adequately represented by the party in the
former action); United States v. ITT Rayonier, Inc., 627 F.2d. 996, 1003 (9th Cir. 1980)
(“[A] ‘privy’ may include those whose interests are represented by one with authority to do
so.”).
43
See Montana, 440 U.S. at 163.
44
This is underscored by Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 and its related jurisprudence, which
precludes the imposition of sanctions on a party who in good faith argues for “an extension,
modification or reversal of existing law.” See Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs
Corp., 801 F.2d 1531, 1537 (9th Cir. 1986).
45
United States v. Moser, 266 U.S. 236, 242 (1924) (emphasis added). This exception is
commonly referred to as the “Moser Exception” based upon the style of the seminal case on
this point.
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preclusive effect as to both legal and factual premises upon which the actual
ruling is predicated. Therefore, the likelihood of forum shopping and
strategic gamesmanship—seeking “a second bite at the apple”—is
measurably and substantially curtailed. In this regard, the fundamental
tenets of international arbitration (party autonomy, uniformity, transparency
of standard, efficiency, and finality) are both furthered and achieved. The
substantive/transactional rubric of the U.S. common law preclusion
doctrine, despite its multiple exceptions and subtleties, is a clearly defined
system that militates towards uniformity in this otherwise fragmented field.
What we urge here is not the unbridled wholesale engrafting of U.S.
common law res judicata and collateral estoppel doctrine on international
commercial and investor–state arbitration. Instead, we suggest something
considerably more modest and less bold; we underscore the possible virtues
of a substantive/transactional approach that transcends boilerplate
application of extremely narrow and formalistic precepts that are conducive
to a disparate and fragmented rubric of preclusion doctrine that further
invites the circumvention of res judicata. Along these lines, the exigency of
a substantive/transactional standard governing res judicata is highlighted
and rendered all the more apparent in a context of international dispute
resolution that is yet to fashion a universally accepted doctrine of binding
precedent or stare decisis.46
IV. ADDRESSING RES JUDICATA IN INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION
The very exigent and fundamental inquiry as to the manner in which
res judicata should apply to treaty-based arbitration is yet to be determined.
Indeed, this critical issue has been the subject matter of scant commentaries
despite a plethora of authority recognizing res judicata as a settled and
important principle of public international law. It cannot, however, be
considered in a vacuum, but rather must be placed in the context of the
broader discussion regarding precedent in international commercial and
investor–state arbitration, a subject with respect to which considerable ink
has been spilled. 47 Several categories of concern readily can be identified,
including instances in which international arbitration tribunals sharply have
46
Obviously, the theoretical and mechanical application of the res judicata and collateral
estoppel doctrines are not without their own difficulties. To cite one illustrative example, the
scope of the Moser Exception often presents difficulties in delineation, most notably where
there is partial congruence in the subject matter of the further disputes. These challenges
notwithstanding, if uniformity in the application of res judicata is to be taken seriously, it
follows that questions of public policy, waiver, reform of the triple-identity test, and scope as
to the dispositive certainly do stand to benefit from a cross-cultural and a cross-system study
of the doctrine with emphasis on those systems that stress an expansive substantive criteria.
47
See, e.g., Tai-Hend Cheng, Precedent and Control in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 30
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1014 (2006–07); W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Toward a Theory of
Precedent in Arbitration, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1895 (2010).
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differed with respect to the interpretation of most-favored nation clauses, 48
the scope of umbrella clauses,49 the meaning of “investment,”50 the
elements of binding consent arising from national legislation on investment
protection,51 and the definition of “state of necessity.” 52 Indeed, even the
very existence of international minimum standards is debated. 53
One scholar described these divergences as among the “dangers” of the
“proliferation of investment arbitration.”54 These situations are profoundly
troubling to the extent that they involve direct conflicts with respect to
substantive issues that are likely to arise again in future arbitrations. They
48

Compare, e.g., Emilio Agustín Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No.
ARB/97/7, Objections to Jurisdiction, (Jan. 25, 2000), 5 ICSID Rep. 396 (2002) with Plama
Consortium Ltd. v. Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, Decision on
Jurisdiction, (Feb. 8, 2005), 44 ILM 721 (2005).
49
Compare, e.g., SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Islamic Republic of
Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/13, Objections to Jurisdiction, (Aug. 6, 2003), 18 ICSID
Rev.-FILJ 301 (2003), 42 ILM 1290 (2003) with SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A.
v. Republic of the Philippines, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6, Objections to Jurisdiction, (Jan.
29, 2004), 8 ICSID Rep. 515 (2004).
50
Compare, e.g., Gruslin v. Malaysia, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/3, Award, ¶¶ 13.5–13.6
(Nov. 27, 2000), 5 ICSID Rep. 483 (2006) with Salini Costrutorri, S.p.A. v. Kingdom of
Morocco, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/4, Decision on Jurisdiction, (July 23, 2001), 42 I.L.M.
609 (2003).
51
Compare, e.g., Southern Pacific Properties (Middle East) Ltd. v. Arab Republic of
Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/84/3, Decision on Jurisdiction, (Apr. 14, 1988) with
Československa Obchodní Banka, a.s. v. Slovak Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/4,
Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 35–6 and 46 (May 24, 1999); Zhinvali
Development Ltd. v. Republic of Georgia, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/1, Award, ¶339, (Jan.
24, 2003).
52
Compare CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/01/8, Award, (May, 12, 2005), 44 I.L.M. 1205 (2005) with LG&E Energy Corp.,
LG&E Capital Corp. and LG&E International Inc. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability, (Oct. 3, 2006), 46 ILM 40 (2007). Indeed, the confusion
with respect to the interpretation of state of necessity was exacerbated by the decision of the
ad hoc committee in Sempra Energy Int’l v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/02/16, Annulment Decision, (June 29, 2010), 49 I.L.M. 1445 (2010).
53
See Maximo Romero Jiminez, Considerations of NAFTA Chapter 11, 2 CHI. J. INT’L L.
244 (2001); see also Guillermo Aguilar Alvarez & William W. Park, The New Face of
Investment Arbitration: NAFTA Chapter 11, 28 YALE J. INT’L L. 365 (2003). In this
connection, at least pursuant to NAFTA Chapter 1105, one NAFTA tribunal affirms that
irrespective of the ongoing debate concerning the existence of international minimum
standards and the extent to which it applies at all, the doctrine exists at least with respect to
NAFTA’s signatories, the United States, Mexico, and Canada. See ADF Group Inc. v.
United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/1 (NAFTA), Award, ¶ 179, (Jan. 9, 2003) (The
tribunal observed that the relevant provision in NAFTA on international minimum standards,
Article 1105(b), “clarifies that so far as the three NAFTA Parties are concerned, the longstanding debate as to whether there exists such a thing as a minimum standard of treatment
of non-nationals and their property prescribed in customary international law, is closed.”).
54
See August Reinisch, The Proliferation of International Dispute Settlement
Mechanisms, in INTERNATIONAL LAW BETWEEN UNIVERSALISM AND FRAGMENTATION :
FESTSCHRIFT IN HONOR OF GERHARD HAFNER 107, 114 (Isabelle Buffard et al. eds., 2008).

434

Res Judicata in Investor–State Arbitration
32:419 (2012)

are particularly disturbing when they arise, as in the state of necessity
context, when the different disputes involve the same respondents. 55
Nevertheless, these concerns pale in comparison with the circumstance
discussed below: divergent holdings in parallel proceedings arising from
the same underlying facts and involving the same parties.
A. The Czech Republic Cases: Lauder and CME
Described by one commentator as the “ultimate fiasco in investment
arbitration,”56 the Lauder57 and CME58 arbitrations against the Czech
Republic (the “Czech Republic Cases”) compellingly illustrate the need for
a sensible approach to res judicata and lis pendens59 in the context of
international arbitration. While the precedents referenced in the previous
section represent instances in which arbitral tribunals have diverged with
respect to the interpretation of BIT provisions in different cases—a
troubling pathology, indeed—the Czech Republic Cases are quite
remarkable in that the two arbitral tribunals reached strikingly different
conclusions in what was substantively the very same dispute.
The core issues in both arbitral proceedings arose from a rather
complex dispute relating to the management and ownership of a recently
privatized television network in the Czech Republic. The first of these
proceedings, Lauder, was initiated on August 19, 1999 pursuant to the BIT
between the Czech Republic and the United States, of which Mr. Lauder
was a citizen. 60 During the pendency of the Lauder proceeding, on
February 22, 2000, CME Czech Republic B.V., a Dutch company
controlled by Mr. Lauder, also initiated a proceedings against the Czech
55
See Emilio Agustín Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7,
Objections to Jurisdiction, (Jan. 25, 2000), 5 ICSID Rep. 396 (2002); Plama Consortium Ltd.
v. Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, Decision on Jurisdiction, (Feb. 8,
2005), 44 ILM 721 (2005). These cases illustrate this same point with respect to conflicting
precedent regarding most-favored nation doctrine involving the very same plaintiff.
56
Reinisch, supra note 54, at 116. Another commentator, perhaps more diplomatically,
referred to the cases as being “the object of severe criticism.” See Bernardo M. Cremades &
Ignacio Madalena, Parallel Proceedings in International Arbitration, 24 ARB. INT’L 507,
515 (2008).
57
Lauder v. Czech Republic, 14 WORLD TRADE & ARB. MATERIALS, no. 3 at 35
(UNCITRAL 2001).
58
CME v. Czech Republic, Final Award, 15 WORLD TRADE & ARB. MATERIALS, no. 4 at
83 (UNICITRAL 2003) [hereinafter CME, Final Award]; see also CME v. Czech Republic,
Partial Award, 14 WORLD TRADE & ARB. MATERIALS, no. 3 at 109 (UNICITRAL 2001)
[hereinafter CME, Partial Award].
59
Though conceptually similar to res judicata, lis pendens applies when the parallel
proceedings are ongoing. Res judicata, in contrast, relates to the binding and preclusive
effects of completed proceedings. See, e.g., INT’L LAW ASS’N, REPORT OF THE SEVENTY–
FIRST CONFERENCE HELD IN BERLIN 1 (2004); INT’L LAW ASS’N, REPORT OF THE SEVENTY–
SECOND CONFERENCE HELD IN TORONTO 1 (2006).
60
CME, Final Award, supra note 58, at ¶ 5.
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Republic under the BIT between the Czech Republic and the Netherlands. 61
The two arbitrations proceeded in parallel until September 3, 2001, when
the tribunal in Lauder issued its Final Award in which it concluded that the
Czech Republic bore no liability for its acts.62 A mere ten days later, on
September 13, 2001, the tribunal in the CME arbitration issued a Partial
Award in which the tribunal reached exactly the opposite result, concluding
that the Czech Republic was liable for its breach of the Czech-Dutch BIT. 63
In its Final Award, issued on March 14, 2003, the CME tribunal imposed
nearly $270 million in damages on the Czech Republic. 64 Although the
Czech Republic had instituted vacatur proceedings before Swedish courts
not long after the issuance of the Partial Award in CME (the CME tribunal
was seated in Stockholm), this petition was not resolved until May 15,
2003, when the Swedish Court of Appeal rejected the motion. 65
Both the CME and Lauder tribunals dispatched arguments relating to
the res judicata or lis pendens effects of the parallel arbitral proceeding.
Each tribunal, after engaging in highly formalistic triple identity analysis,
perhaps not surprisingly reached the same result. 66 Acknowledging that
international tribunals have accepted the triple identity test for res judicata,
the CME tribunal rightfully stated that it requires “the ‘same’ dispute,
identical parties, the same subject matter, and the same cause of action.” 67
However, several paragraphs before describing the test that it would apply,
the tribunal had already outlined its conclusion:
The parties in the [Lauder] Arbitration differ from the parties in this
arbitration. Mr. Lauder is the controlling shareholder of CME Media
Ltd, whereas in this arbitration a Dutch holding company being part
of the CME Media Ltd Group is the Claimant. The two arbitrations
are based on differing bilateral investment treaties, which grant
comparable investment protection, which, however, is not
identical. . . .Because the two bilateral investment treaties create
61

See id.
See Lauder, supra note 57, ¶ 407, at 107–08. Notably, although the tribunal chose not
to impose liability on the Czech Republic, it nevertheless concluded that it had breached the
U.S.–Czech BIT. Id.
63
CME, Partial Award, supra note 58, ¶ 624, at 286–87.
64
CME, Final Award, supra note 58, ¶¶ 648–49, at 243.
65
Svea hovrätt [Court of Appeals] 2003-3-15 T8735-01 (Swed.) translated in 15 WORLD
TRADE & ARB. MATERIALS, no. 5 at 171 (2003).
66
It should be noted that in addition to the triple-identity analysis, both tribunals also
engaged in a waiver analysis, which also justified the decision to move forward on the basis
of the Czech Republic’s alleged refusal to agree to the consolidation of the two arbitrations.
See CME, Final Award, supra note 58, ¶¶ 426–30, at 181–82; see also Lauder, supra note
57, ¶ 173, at 69. In addition, the CME tribunal also grounded its conclusion that the Czech
Republic had waived any res judicata arguments on the formalistic ground that, rather than
specifically invoking res judicata, the Czech Republic instead invoked the argument of
“abuse of process.” See CME, Final Award, supra note 58, ¶ 431, at 182.
67
CME, Final Award, supra note 58, ¶ 435, at 183.
62
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rights that are not in all respects exactly the same, different claims
are necessarily formulated.68

The tribunal neglected to mention that the claimant “Dutch holding
company,” that it referred to as merely “being part of the CME Media Ltd
Group” (CME Czech Republic B.V.) was the undisputed controlling party
of the CME Media Ltd Group.69 Thus, although the distinction surely
existed in form, it remains questionable to what extent it existed in
substance.
The tribunal in Lauder went one step further than the CME tribunal as
it willfully suspended disbelief:
The Arbitral Tribunal considers that the Respondent’s recourse to the
principle of lis alibi pendens to be of no use, since all the other court
and arbitration proceedings involve different parties and different
causes of action. . . . [N]o possibility exists that any other court or
arbitral tribunal can render a decision similar to or inconsistent with
the award which will be issued by this Arbitral Tribunal, i.e., that the
Czech Republic breached or did not breach the Treaty, and is or is
not liable for damages towards Mr. Lauder.70

Once again, while this assertion was true formally, it does not comport
with the dissonant reality that the conflicting awards in these parallel
proceedings produced.
One fascinating element present in the CME Final Award is an explicit
reference and reliance upon the Lauder tribunal. Specifically, the CME
tribunal asserts that the Lauder tribunal essentially waived aside the risk of
conflicting decisions:
This holding of the Tribunal is supported by the London [Lauder]
Tribunal’s findings, according to which the Respondent’s recourse in
the London [Lauder] Arbitration to the principle of lis alibi pendens
was held to be of no use, since all the other court and arbitration
proceedings involved different parties and different causes of
actions. The London [Lauder] Tribunal considered the risk that the
two Tribunals may decide differently. It identified the risk that
damages could be concurrently granted by more than one court or
arbitral tribunal, in which case the amount of damages granted by the
second deciding court or arbitral tribunal could take this fact into
consideration when addressing the final damage . . . . It did not see
an issue in differing decisions, which is a normal fact of forensic life,
when different parties litigate the same dispute (which is not

68
69
70

Id. ¶¶ 432–33, at 182.
See Lauder, supra note 57, ¶ 77, at 51.
Id. ¶ 171, at 68.
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necessarily the case in all respects in this arbitration).71

In fact, however, the Lauder tribunal did express some concern with
respect to the possibility of conflicting decisions, but ultimately relied upon
a rather formalistic rationale:
There might exist the possibility of contradictory findings of this
Arbitral Tribunal and the one set up to examine the claims of CME
against the Czech Republic under the Dutch-Czech Bilateral
Investment treaty. Obviously, the claimants in the two proceedings
are not identical. However, this Arbitral Tribunal understands that
the claim of Mr. Lauder giving rise to the present proceeding was
commenced before the claims of CME was raised and, especially, the
Respondent itself did not agree to a de facto consolidation of the two
proceedings by insisting on a different arbitral tribunal to hear
CME’s case.72

That the Lauder tribunal referenced the first-filed principle to assuage
its concerns of the very real possibility of “contradictory findings” not only
elevates procedural niceties, but also should have served as a shot across the
CME tribunal’s bow. Essentially, the Lauder tribunal sought to establish its
primary jurisdiction on the basis of its chronological precedence.
Despite the extensive analysis of the tribunals, the proceedings were
substantively identical. Indeed, before examining the Czech Republic’s res
judicata and lis pendens arguments, the tribunal in CME candidly
acknowledged that the Lauder arbitration “in substance dealt with the same
dispute that is the object of these proceedings.” 73 Nevertheless, the
mechanical analysis of both tribunals—standing in stark contrast to the
substantive/transactional approach that we advocate—demonstrably failed
to address the novel circumstance. Given the rapid proliferation of
investment treaties and the increasingly complex nature of international
corporate structures, the consequences of this failure, and the implications
of these decisions “will not remain an isolated incident.”74
B. Southern Bluefin Tuna and the Emergence of a
Substantive/Transactional Approach in UNCLOS Arbitration
In contrast to the classical formalism that the tribunals in the Czech
Republic Cases employed, the tribunal in the 1982 United Nations
71

CME, Final Award, supra note 58, ¶ 434 (citing Lauder, supra note 57, ¶¶ 171–72,
174, at 68 & 69).
72
Lauder, supra note 57, ¶ 173, at 69 (emphasis added).
73
CME, Final Award, supra note 58, ¶ 25, at 95–96.
74
August Reinisch, The Use and Limits of Res Judicata and Lis Pendens as Procedural
Tools to Avoid Conflicting Dispute Settlement Outcomes, 3 LAW & PRACTICE OF INT’L
COURTS & TRIBUNALS 37, 41 (2004).
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Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) arbitration widely referred to
as the Southern Bluefin Tuna case adopts a refreshingly resourceful
approach, much akin to the substantive/transactional test advocated for in
this article. 75 Essentially, the tribunal was confronted with a circumstance
in which two separate treaties, UNCLOS and the Convention for the
Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT), seemingly applied to the
matter, yet provided differing dispute resolution terms. Even though the
Southern Bluefin Tuna tribunal was not confronted with res judicata or lis
pendens, its analysis nevertheless relied strongly on both of those concepts.
Instead of focusing on procedural niceties and distinguishing between the
two treaties with which it was confronted, the tribunal instead looked
directly to the substance of the claim:
The Tribunal accepts Article 16 of the [CCSBT] . . . as an agreement
by the Parties to seek settlement of the instant dispute by peaceful
means of their own choice. It so concludes even though it has held
that this dispute, while centered in the . . . [CCSBT], also implicates
obligations under UNCLOS. It does so because the Parties to this
dispute—the real terms of which have been defined above—are the
same Parties grappling not with two separate disputes but with what
in fact is a single dispute arising under both Conventions. To find
that, in this case, there is a dispute actually arising under UNCLOS
which is distinct from the dispute that arose under the CCSBT would
be artificial.76

Its conclusion that treating the disputes under the UNCLOS and
CCSBT as distinct would be artificial is arresting, if only for its simple and
manifest rationality.
Although some have construed this decision narrowly, concluding that
it largely applies to the second prong of the triple identity test (identity of
grounds or subject matter),77 the substantive/transactional approach adopted
by the tribunal also lends itself to a broader construction that can be applied
to all prongs of the triple identity test. This more flexible interpretation
draws us ever closer to the U.S. common law analysis, which we suggest
could serve as an effective model for the substantive/transactional approach.
C. Emerging Challenges in ICSID Arbitration: Saipem, GEA Group, and
the Rise of “Supervisory-Supervisory” Authority in Investor-State
75
See Southern Bluefin Tuna Case (Austl. & N.Z. v. Japan), Case No. 3 & 4, Award on
Jurisdiction & Admissibility (Aug. 4, 2000).
76
Id. ¶ 54, at 39.
77
See Reinisch, supra note 74, at 64. Compare Southern Bluefin Tuna (Austl. & N.Z. v.
Japan), Case No. 3 & 4, Award on Jurisdiction & Admissibility on Aug. 4, 2000) with CME,
Final Award, supra note 58 and Lauder, Final Award (demonstrating differences in the way
that the court analyzed what constitute the same parties in Southern Bluefhin Tuna and the
United States and Dutch BITs in the Czech Republic Cases).
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Arbitration
The immediacy of addressing the concerns involving supervisorysupervisory authority arises from the award of the ICSID tribunal in Saipem
S.p.A. v. The People’s Republic of Bangladesh,78 and more recently, the
ICSID award in GEA Group Aktiengesellschaft v. Ukraine79 (GEA Group or
GEA). Even though considerable ink has been spilled analyzing this
authority, more so in the case of the Saipem award, the issues raised in both
of these proceedings have not been addressed within finality, a preclusion
context, or within a res judicata framework. Further, even though the
Saipem award deservedly has garnered meaningful disapproval in the form
of academic critique, the tribunal in GEA Group almost regrettably limits
its disavowance, as shall be discussed in detail, to technical grounds framed
by the very narrow issues that the parties presented in GEA Group, and
based upon drawing factual but not conceptual distinctions.
Professor Reisman aptly has written that, “Saipem if ultimately
cautious in its holding, is, nonetheless far-reaching in its implications, for it
adapts the mechanisms of international investment law as expressed in
bilateral investment treaties, to serve as a review of the proper discharge by
national courts of their responsibilities under the New York Convention.” 80
In this way, Professor Reisman conceptualizes the novel role that the
tribunal in Saipem has carved out for international tribunals as supervisorysupervisory fora.
Extrapolating just ever so slightly on Professor Reisman’s
observations, the Saipem award, despite being cloaked with the mantle of a
very narrow and singular ruling limited only and exclusively to an
extraordinarily particular set of facts, has the practical and theoretical
effects of: (i) wresting from municipal courts their normative obligations
with respect to the New York Convention; (ii) transforming and deforming
international tribunals into second-instance appellate venues sitting in
judgment of the manner in which municipal courts process applications for
the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments; (iii) substantially
limiting the scope of the New York Convention; (iv) fashioning a new
category of “investments” under Article 25 of the ICSID Convention; (v)
denaturalizing international commercial arbitration; (vi) providing more
duplicative arbitral proceedings; and (vii) undermining the elementary
precepts that underlie international arbitration generally.
78
Saipem S.p.A. v. The People’s Republic of Bangladesh, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/07,
Decision on Jurisdiction, (Mar. 21, 2007), available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/F
rontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC529_En&caseId=C52.
79
GEA Group Aktiengesellschaft v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/16, Award, (Mar.
31, 2011), available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=Cases
RH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC2131_En&caseId=C440.
80
W. Michael Reisman & Heide Iravani, The Changing Relation of National Courts and
International Commercial Arbitration, 21 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 5, 39 (2011).
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A second commentator quite thoughtfully criticized Saipem for
permitting commercial arbitration cases to be “dressed up” as investor-state
treaty disputes. 81
Reflecting on Saipem, post-GEA Group, certain
commentators have ventured to opine that Saipem is hardly “precedent.” In
a very carefully considered commentary, it was noted that “[a]s far as
precedent goes, the Saipem decision has proved to be controversial.” 82 The
author explains how subsequent tribunals “have tended to tread very
carefully to avoid being seen as sitting in judgment over the decisions of
national courts and performing the role of a supra-national appellate
body”83 and “in many respects, the Saipem approach has come to be
considerably diluted.”84
The numerous debilities and uncertainties incident to the very doctrine
of precedent in investor-state arbitration calls into question whether,
doctrinally, the issues that the Saipem award raises should be addressed and
discussed within the parameters of the law of precedent. If transparency
and certainty are to be taken seriously, this dialogue must be had pursuant
to a different doctrinal construct. It is here that the principle of res judicata
becomes determinative. In addition, the most recent ICSID award to date
that addresses Saipem and that is bottomed on analogous averments—GEA
Group—at least from a procedural posture and pursuant to petitioner’s
averments, falls far short from conceptually disavowing Saipem.
1. Saipem v. Bangladesh
The claimant, Saipem S.p.A (Saipem), on February 14, 1990, executed
a contract with The Bangladesh Oil, Gas and Mineral Corp. (Petrobangla), a
state entity. The contract’s objective was to build a pipeline of 400
kilometers for purposes of transporting condensate and gas to locations in
the northeast section of Bangladesh. Significantly, the project was to be
completed by a certain date, but was materially delayed. The causes for the
delay were attributed to a dispute between the parties, and after negotiated
extensions, disagreement concerning compensatory damages arising from
the delays precipitated the filing of an arbitration request on June 7, 1993,
consonant with an arbitral clause calling for ICC arbitration.
Despite Petrobangla’s unsuccessful application to multiple tribunals
seeking revocation of the ICC proceeding and a stay, on April 30, 2001, the
ICC tribunal resumed proceedings and finally issued an award
approximately two years later on May 9, 2003. The tribunal held that
81

Ruth Teitelbaum, Case Report on Saipem v. Bangladesh, 26 ARB. INT’L 313 (2010).
Promod Nair, State Responsibility for Non-Enforcement of Arbitral Awards: Revisiting
Saipem Two Years On, Kluwer Arbitration Blog (Aug. 25, 2011), http://kluwerarbitration
blog.com/blog/2011/08/25/state-responsibility-for-non-enforcement-of-arbitral-awards-revisi
ting-saipem-two-years-on/ (last visited Sept. 5, 2012).
83
Id.
84
Id.
82
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Petrobangla had breached its contractual obligation to compensate Saipem
for the time extension and additional work and ordered Petrobangla to pay
Saipem the total amount of USD $6,148,770.80 plus €110,995.92 (USD
$142,584.39).85
The Bangladeshi courts annulled the ICC award, and on October 5,
2004, Saipem filed a request for arbitration with the International Center for
Settlement of Investment Disputes. The tribunal ruled in Saipem’s favor
and observed:
After having carefully reviewed the arguments of the parties in
having taken into account all the circumstances of the case, and in
particular the fact that the expropriation rites at hand were Saipem’s
residual contractual rights under the investment as crystallized in the
ICC Award . . . the Tribunal considers that in the present case the
amount awarded by the ICC Award constitutes the best valuation of
the compensation due under the Chorzów Factory principle.86

By adopting the amount awarded by the ICC tribunal in the underlying
arbitration award that the Bangladeshi courts vacated, the tribunal
unavoidably highlighted the indivisibility of the two arbitration
proceedings.
2. GEA Group v. Ukraine
As in Saipem, the petitioner GEA Group entered into contractual
relationships with Oriana, a state-owned (in this case Ukrainian) company,
pursuant to which GEA Group 87 would provide Oriana with 200,000 tons of
NAPHTA fuel for conversion.88 Later agreements with Oriana relating to
delivery of the “Conversion Contract” products were executed (a
“Settlement Agreement” and a “Repayment Agreement”). Unable to
resolve indebtedness disputes resulting from the differences between those
85
Saipem S.p.A. v. People’s Republic of Bangladesh, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/07,
Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 48 (Mar. 21, 2007), available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/
ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC529_En&case
Id=C52.
86
Id. ¶ 202.
87
Its predecessor in interest was Klöckner & Co. Aktiengesellschaft (referenced as “New
Klöckner” throughout the award). A recitation of relevant name changes and corporate
mergers concerning GEA Group’s predecessors of interest is set forth with careful detail that
includes a chart illustrating the various partnerships, subsidiaries and operative relationships
between and among these predecessors. GEA Group Aktiengesellschaft v. Ukraine, ICSID
Case No. ARB/08/16, Award, ¶¶ 32–43 (Mar. 31, 2011), available at
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&
actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC2131_En&caseId=C440.
88
See id. ¶ 44. During a two-year time frame (between 1996 and 1998) the operative
contract for the provision of the NAPTHA fuel for conversion (“Conversion Contract”) was
significantly amended (147 out of a total of 154 amendments).
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products that should have been delivered and those products that either
actually were delivered or that were then available for delivery gave rise to
an ICC arbitration against Oriana.89 The tribunal entered an award in the
GEA Group’s favor in the amount of USD $30,381,661.44 for
compensatory damages, in addition to interest, arbitration costs, and
attorney’s fees. 90
GEA’s application to the Appellate Court of the Ivano-Frankivsk
Region was unavailing on the ground that Oriana was not duly authorized
pursuant to Ukrainian legislation to tender payments for the product
received. 91
Consonant with Saipem’s strategy, GEA Group filed an arbitration
against Ukraine pursuant to the BIT between the Federal Republic of
Germany and Ukraine.92 Significantly, the tribunal primarily ruled in
Ukraine’s favor and against GEA Group on four distinct grounds following
a classical analysis and never considering, even in “dicta,” a claim
preclusion theory.
First, the tribunal analyzed the ICC award as the third category of
averred investments comprising claimant’s basis for relief. 93 Focusing on
the criteria of Article 1 of the BIT or Article 25 of the ICSID Convention, it
reasoned that “the ICC Award—in and of itself—cannot constitute an
‘investment.’ Properly analyzed, it is a legal instrument, which provides for
the disposition of rights and obligations arising out of the Settlement
Agreement and Repayment Agreement (neither of which was itself an
‘investment’). . . .”94
Indeed, the grammatical structure and syntax establishes that the
tribunal ruled that the award—in and of itself—cannot constitute an
investment, only because it rests on instruments that themselves in turn do
not constitute investments. The tribunal, highlighting claimant’s reliance
89

Id. ¶¶ 51–52, 56–57.
Id. ¶ 62.
91
The Appellate Court ruled: “Considering the case, the court ascertained that the
[Repayment Agreement] was concluded and signed in contradiction to the Ukrainian
effective legislation by the representatives of OJSC “‘Oriana’ without duly authorized
powers.” Id. ¶ 65. Following a series of appeals, the Supreme Court of Ukraine rejected
GEA’s cassation complaint. Id. ¶ 67.
92
Vertrag zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Ukraine über die
Förderung und den gegenseitigen Schutz von Kapitalanlagen [Agreement between the
Federal Republic of Germany and Ukraine on the Promotion and Mutual Protection of
Investments], Ger.–Ukr., Feb. 15, 1993, ICSID Rep v. 5.
93
The tribunal observed that “[t]he Claimant argues that the ICC Award, in and of itself,
falls under Article 1(1)(c) of the BIT because it liquidated the amount due under the
Settlement Agreement and Repayment Agreement as of 2002.”
GEA Group
Aktiengesellschaft v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/16, Award, ¶ 159 (Mar. 31, 2011),
availalable at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&action
Val=showDoc&docId=DC2131_En&caseId=C440.
94
Id. ¶ 161.
90
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on Saipem, stated that the tribunal in that case fashioned propositions that
are “difficult to reconcile,” such that:
the ICC arbitration is part of the investment (under the heading: “Has
Saipem made an investment under Article 25 of the ICSID
Convention?’); that the ICC Award is not part of the investment
(under the heading: “Does the dispute arise directly out of the
Investment?”); and that it is unnecessary to decide whether the ICC
award is part of the investment (under the heading “Jurisdictional
objections under the BIT”).”95

However, it never entertained a preclusive effect theory or doctrine. 96
Second, addressing the parties’ contentions as to expropriation, the
tribunal engaged in a contra-factual analysis and notably refrained either
from (i) flatly disagreeing with the Saipem award on conceptual grounds
(i.e., under no reasonable analysis should a commercial arbitration award
constitute an investment and an unsuccessful enforcement action a taking),
or (ii) engaging in a doctrinally preclusive exegesis. Instead, it proceeded
to distinguish Saipem in an unremarkable common-law like analysis.
After disagreeing with the Saipem tribunal’s analysis,97 it identified a
“discriminatory law” standard and found that:
contrary to Saipem, the Tribunal has been presented with no
evidence that the actions taken by the Ukrainian courts were
“egregious” in any way; that they amounted to anything other than
95
96
97

Id. ¶ 163.
See id. ¶¶ 163–64.
The GEA Group tribunal summarized the Saipem analysis as follows:
In Saipem, the Bangladeshi courts annulled an ICC Award in Saipem’s favour. In
¶ 133 of its award, the tribunal stated that setting aside an arbitral award cannot, in
and of itself, amount to an expropriation:
[T]he Tribunal agrees with the parties that the substantial deprivation of
Saipem’s ability to enjoy the benefits of the ICC Award is not sufficient to
conclude that the Bangladeshi courts’ intervention is tantamount to an
expropriation. If this were true, any setting aside of an award could then
found a claim for expropriation, even if the setting aside was ordered by the
competent state court upon legitimate grounds.
The tribunal then concluded that, based on the circumstances of that case, the nonenforcement of the ICC Award amounted to an expropriation due to the
particularly egregious nature of the acts of the Bangladeshi courts.
The Claimant attempts in this case [GEA Group] to deploy this standard,
contending that Ukraine committed “a travesty of justice in applying a
discriminatory law to avoid enforcement of GEA’s Award.”

Id. ¶¶ 233–35.
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the application of Ukrainian law; or that they were somehow
deliberately taken to thwart GEA’s ability to recover on the ICC
Award.98

Third, as to a violation of fair and equitable treatment, again after
restating that it already had found that the ICC Award itself did not
constitute an investment, the tribunal, applying the Mondev International
Ltd. v. United States of America test agreed to by the parties, 99 enunciated
that:
[it] does not have any “justified concerns as to the judicial propriety
of the outcome” of the decisions of the Ukrainian courts in view of
“generally accepted standards of the administration of justice.”
Accordingly, the Tribunal concludes that there is nothing “clearly
improper and discreditable” with respect to those decisions, with the
result that the Claimant’s claim that, if the ICC Award would have
been considered an investment, its investment has not been subject to
fair and equitable treatment is rejected. 100

Fourth and finally, the tribunal’s application of the National Treatment
and Most Favored Nation standards is equally disappointing because of its
narrow methodology. It merely sought to distinguish factually GEA
Group’s reliance on the claims of the Seychelles Company that were
adjudicated in Regent Company v. Ukraine.101 Here the emphasis on
merely distinguishing the case could not be more glaring. The GEA Group
award in relevant part reads:
98
99

Id. ¶ 236.
At paragraph 312, the tribunal states:
The test is not whether a particular result is surprising, but whether the shock or
surprise occasioned to an impartial tribunal leads, on reflection, to justified
concerns as to the judicial propriety of the outcome, bearing in mind on the one
hand that international tribunals are not courts of appeal, and on the other hand that
Chapter 11 of NAFTA (like other treaties for the protection of investments) is
intended to provide a real measure of protection. In the end the question is
whether, at an international level and having regard to generally accepted
standards of the administration of justice, a tribunal can conclude in the light of all
the available facts that the impugned decision was clearly improper and
discreditable, with the result that the investment has been subjected to unfair and
inequitable treatment. This is admittedly a somewhat open-ended standard, but it
may be that in practice no more precise formula can be offered to cover the range
of possibilities.

Id. ¶ 312 (quoting Mondev Int’l Ltd. v. United States (Can. v. U.S.), ICSD Case No.
ARB(AF)/99/2, Award, 6 ICSID Rep. 192 (2004).
100
Id. ¶ 319.
101
Regent Co. v. Ukraine, Application No. 773/03, EUR Ct. H.R. (2008), available at
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=
773/03&sessionid=86286133&skin=hudoc-en (emphasis in original).
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With respect to the purported unequal treatment between the
Claimant and the Seychelles company, the Tribunal is not convinced
that the situation of the Seychelles company is comparable to that of
GEA. In the Tribunal’s view, the simple fact that the claim of the
Seychelles company was not time-barred does not, in and of itself,
mean anything in particular taking into account the differences in the
procedural posture between that case and the one at hand. 102

Following this line of thinking, the tribunal found analytical support in
drawing a distinction between the pre-investment and post-investment
strictures of Article 6 of the Law on Foreign Economic Activities. It thus
observed that while this particular legislation indeed imposes on foreigners
greater obstacles to investment than it does with respect to nationals, the
post-investment regime applies equally and in the same manner to both
nationals and foreigners, a distinction that in itself exalts form over
substance. Both arguments taken in tandem, distinguishing the immediate
investor from the Seychelles Company claimant and reconciling the
asymmetries as to Article 6, facilitated rejection of GEA Group’s claim that
it was discriminated against in violation of Article 3 of the BIT. 103
It would be misguided to conclude that the tribunal in GEA Group was
right for the wrong reasons. In the final analysis, the tribunal reached its
holding by timidly finding that “the ICC Award—in and of itself—cannot
constitute an investment.”104 This statement, however, cannot be severed
from its syntax. It ultimately proceeded to qualify the proposition by
conceptually connecting the premise to the underlying facts of the case—
namely that the award “provides for the disposition of rights and obligations
arising out of the Settlement Agreement and Repayment Agreement
(neither of which was itself an investment). . . .”105
The analysis in GEA Group is disappointing. Specifically, it did not
go far enough, and dared not, at least in part, premise its findings and ruling
on the inevitable and necessary consequences of denaturalizing the
underlying international commercial arbitration and transforming it into an
investor–state dispute. At the same time, it enshrined treaty-based
arbitrations as sitting in judgment of the conduct of national courts and their
application of the New York Convention—a framework that undermines
both international commercial arbitration and investor–state arbitration.
The logical corollary to the tribunal’s narrow investment analysis is
that an ICC Award, when tested against the criteria of the applicable article
of the BIT at issue or Article 25 of the ICSID Convention—in and of
102
GEA Group Aktiengesellschaft v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/16, Award, ¶
342 (Mar. 31, 2011), availalable at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?
requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC2131_En&caseId=C440.
103
Id. ¶¶ 344–45.
104
Id. ¶ 161 (internal quotation omitted).
105
Id. (internal quotation omitted).
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itself—shall constitute an investment. That is true so long as, when
properly analyzed, the award provides for the dispositions of rights and
obligations arising out of legal instruments that—in and of themselves—
properly constitute “investments” under the standard of the operative BIT
or Article 5 of the Convention.
Quite remarkably, both Saipem (reaching a wrong result but based on a
contradictory analysis that in general terms acknowledges the folly of
having a commercial arbitration award constitute an investment under a
BIT) and GEA Group (reaching a correct result but on a weak analysis that
conceptually, contingent on the happenstance of a fact pattern, leaves open
the possibility for the recognition as a principle of international law that an
international commercial arbitral award may constitute an investment
pursuant to a BIT and within the purview of Article 25 of the Convention)
are narrowly tailored opinions that leave much to be desired. The undue
emphasis on specificity is not helpful for other tribunals that will continue
to face the same aberrant procedural configuration. Therefore, both awards
contribute to the possibility, and now likelihood, of duplicative arbitration,
protracted proceedings, uncertainty, and a diminished view of national
courts under the New York Convention. They have also likely contributed
to greater costs and inefficiencies in international arbitration. The timehonored precepts of party autonomy, predictability, uniformity,
transparency of standard, and efficiency, were not best served by either
award, notwithstanding the GEA Group award’s ruling.
Both awards highlight the need for the application of a res judicata
doctrine to investor–state arbitration. The uncertain status of the role of
precedent in international arbitration additionally buttresses the need for the
application of a res judicata doctrine.
To be sure, the application of res judicata, particularly in the context of
investor–state arbitration, certainly is not without its challenges. Most
notably, the further case (i.e. the investor–state arbitration that follows an
international commercial arbitration, where recognition and enforcement
were denied) almost of necessity will not meet the same parties prong of
the triple identity test. An expansive iteration of the doctrine premised on a
substantive/transactional standard would be responsive to this specific
obstacle. The res judicata doctrine would obviate the waste, time, and
inefficiencies that even a surface analysis of both Saipem and GEA Group
reveals, as neither proceeding justified a full merits hearing. Thus, while
productive for the arbitrators and the lawyers, the non-application of the
doctrine was a disservice to the parties and to arbitration generally. The
very fact that res judicata, albeit different species of the doctrine, is
universally accepted and codified as applicable to international commercial
arbitration should herald the use of the doctrine in investor–state disputes.
However, only an expansive substantive/transactional version of the
doctrine akin to that explored here, and pursuant to the U.S. common law
paradigm, would meaningfully address the singular issues endemic to
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investor–state arbitration.
The treatment of an international commercial arbitration award as an
investment far exceeds the already immense consequences of elevating a
commercial contractual dispute into an international treaty-based contention
governed by international public law. It, in effect, represents an extreme
application of an omnibus umbrella clause, as it incorporates directly and
explicitly non-treaty premised contractual causes of action and, therefore,
incident defenses and affirmative defenses as well. This phenomenon
should not and cannot be analyzed as an aberrant doctrinal development
occurring in a void that is filled by the particularity of an isolated dispute—
one that may give rise to the premises from which counsel and arbitrators
alike may infer a new category of investment (i.e., an actual commercial
arbitration award).
Quite the contrary, it is but the continuation of a well-defined and
discernable trend that aspires to the “internationalization of state-contracts.”
Pursuant to this school of thought, an expansive and non-restrictive reading
of bilateral investment treaties is encouraged so as to maximize the panoply
of doctrinal protections accorded to investors at the price of limiting the
host state’s (typically a capital importing country) regulatory ambit. This
theory seeks to promote the purported stability of state contracts by
removing them from the sphere of municipal law (i.e., that of the host
state). In turn, it advocates for the importation of “principles of
international law” into the arena of investor–state disputes so that investors’
rights are protected beyond the doctrinal gamut embodied in investment
protection treaties.
The net effect is the wholesale importation of private international law
doctrine into public international law, which far exceeds the expectations of
the contracting parties who sought equal and equitable bilateralism or
multilateralism in negotiating, executing, and implementing investment
treaties. An international investment treaty, at least from a theoretical
configuration, aspires to symmetry/parity between the member contracting
states with respect to protection. This aspiration is fundamentally frustrated
when contractual claims are brought before international tribunals and
international arbitral tribunals are charged with the imperative of overseeing
the propriety of compliance with mere contractual obligations and, in many
instances, pre-entry investment representations.106 The expansive review of
international investment treaties and the attribution of special normative
status to state contracts render the workings of bilateral investment treaties
wholly asymmetrical. It is true that even the most rudimentary choice of
law test when applied to state contracts would suggest that domestic law is
applicable, certainly when measured by place of performance, location of
resources, negotiation, and collateral effects. However, the dual contention
106

Admittedly, there is a paucity of authority finding a violation of a treatment standard
based upon pre-entry investment treatment violations.
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that a state contract is quasi-public and entails an arguably international
obligation has been deemed dispositive in removing the doctrinally
applicable host state’s substantive law from representing even a partially
determinative element of the analysis. Instead, international principles are
applied, without sustained explanation, with respect to significant queries
that need to be addressed.
By way of example, it can be argued that there is no single
comprehensive body of international public law addressing substantive
principles of contract law. In this same vein, the selection of “applicable
international law principles” is not guided by any single criteria, and
therefore, by necessity is rendered circumstantial and arbitrary. In the
selection of these principles often the penchant of arbitrators who seek to
promote investment protection despite the need to safeguard the host state’s
regulatory sphere prevails as a decisive factor in this exercise of “principle
selection.” Despite the legal fiction that state contracts are somehow quasipublic, claims asserted by multinational corporations should not be allowed
to elevate principles of private international law so that they may attain
treaty status. It is legitimate to inquire whether a private entity or natural
person would even have sufficient international standing or personality to
modify the scope of treaties negotiated and executed by contracting states
and not individuals. Can a private entity or natural person have standing to
contest a purely commercial contractual dispute in an arena of public
international law? Should multinational corporations be accorded authority
to amend treaty claims to include commercial causes of action arising from
non-investments in the realm of private international law?
It would be a mistake to read Saipem v. Bangladesh and GEA v.
Ukraine as idiosyncratic cases, narrowly tailored to their facts. The demise
of traditional conceptions of sovereignty fosters both the expansive
construction of international investment treaties and the importation of
international law principles into the substantive law arena of disputes
concerning state contracts.
V. CONCLUSION
Economic globalization commands a juridical counterpart in the field
of international dispute resolution. International arbitration serves that
function and will continue to do so until such time as transnational tribunals
of civil procedure come into being. The uncertain nature and application of
the doctrine of precedent—stare decisis—in international arbitration
underscores the immediate need (i) for application of a transnational res
judicata doctrine, and (ii) uniformity in the elements and application of the
doctrine. Regrettably, although universally accepted, the doctrine in its
current status is fragmented because it is territorially based and ill-suited for
use in an environment of economic globalization that aspires to be
monolithic, at least with respect to the scope of a global market economy
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that finds no historical precedent.
Even among civil law jurisdictions the basic elements of the triple
identity test vary significantly. The nature and character of this fragmented
civil law regime are made worse by the disparities between it and the
configuration of the doctrine in common law jurisdictions, particularly U.S.
common law. Such rudimentary questions as the extent to which res
judicata is a matter of public policy that may be raised by a decision maker
sua sponte, whether the doctrine applies to the ruling or disposit only and
not the grounds or reasons underlying, as well as if, how, and to whom it
applies in the context of non-parties are essential to the uniform application
of the doctrine. Attendant to these irregularities are equally fundamental
disparities among nations between the plain language of the codified
doctrine and the actual practice in its application, not to mention virtually
endless permutations of each element of the triple identity test.
The U.S. common law version of res judicata may serve as a
substantial conceptual bastion from which civil law and common law res
judicata precepts may merge in fashioning a uniform doctrine that is
expansive, substantive/transactional-based as to criteria, and non-formalistic
in its application so as to avert and discourage the doctrine’s circumvention
through the use of legal fictions. This expansive version of the doctrine is
particularly well-suited to address the complexities of applying res judicata
in the context of investor–state arbitration. This is demonstrated by the
conflicting lines of awards in Saipem and GEA Group, together with the
paucity of conceptual development that both tribunals exemplified in
addressing unvarnished examples of duplicative arbitrations that never
should have been brought in the first instance, which only served to fuel
flames that were always smoldering. The non-application of the doctrine to
investor–state arbitrations, among other concerns, denaturalizes (i)
international commercial arbitration, (ii) treaty-based arbitration, and (iii)
the rule of domestic courts and their responsibilities under the New York
Convention. The doctrine is ripe for development.
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